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THE LATEST EVENT IN THE CONFUSED HISTORY OF
MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY
J. BART BUDETTI*
GERALD L. KNIGHT**

I.

INTRODUCTION

For Florida governmental entities and plaintiffs' attorneys, one of
the most significant proposals by the Florida Constitution Revision
Commission is Proposal 197, which would replace article X, section
13 of the Florida Constitution' with a new article X, section 12,
providing as follows:
SECTION 12

....
No sovereign immunity in contract or in
tort.-The doctrine of sovereign immunity shall not be applicable
in this state in contract or in tort for personal injury, wrongful
death or property damage. Punitive damages shall not be recoverable against the state, counties, school districts, municipalities,
special districts or any of their agencies.'
*

City Attorney, Hallandale, Florida. B.A. 1965, Wichita State University; J.D. 1971,

University of Texas at Austin.
** General Counsel, Broward County Planning Council. B.A. 1969, University of Florida;
J.D. 1973, University of Florida.
1. Article X, § 13 now provides that "[pirovision may be made by general law for
bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating."
2. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. X, § 12 (May 11, 1978). Proposal 197 superseded
Proposal 98, which was passed December 9, 1977. The Local Government Committee had
proposed a change in § 13 to ensure that any limit of sovereign immunity by the legislature
would apply to all governmental entities. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 117 (Dec.
9, 1977) (remarks of Commissioner Overton). Proposal 98 was amended significantly to provide: "The state and all of its political subdivisions shall be liable for all injuries and compensatory damages resulting from their wrongful acts. Provision shall be made by general law
for such suits, providing full and complete recovery for all compensatory damages and
losses." See 15 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 239-40 (Dec. 9, 1977). Commissioner Douglass, author of the
primary amendment, maintained that his amendment was intended to accomplish what the
Local Government Committee wanted-to make everyone equal. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C.
proceedings 118 (Dec. 9, 1977).
The issue resurfaced one month later with Proposal 197, which provided: "The doctrine of
sovereign immunity shall not be applicable in this state." After extensive debate, Proposal
197 was adopted as introduced. 24 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 351-52 (Jan. 26, 1978); see Transcript of
Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 237-96 (Jan. 26, 1978).
The proposal was then amended twice before arriving in its final form. Commissioner Ben
Overton considered the original proposal too "broad" and offered an amendment providing
that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity shall not be applicable in this state in contract or
in tort for personal injury, wrongful death or property damage. Punitive damages shall not
be recoverable against the state or its political subdivisions." The amendment was adopted.
29 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 553 (Mar. 9, 1978); 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 156, 159 (Mar.
9, 1978). The Committee on Style and Drafting offered a second amendment to enumerate
the governmental entities to which the punitive damages provision applied. That amendment
changed the last sentence to read: "Punitive damages shall not be recoverable against the
state, counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts or any of their agencies." 30
Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 560 (Apr. 14, 1978); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 36-37 (Apr. 14,
1978).
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The proposed new section would substantially abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Florida.3 It suggests a radical but
relatively comprehensible change in the current state of the law of
tort liability of the state and counties. 4 However, due to a confused
history of legislative and judicial activity, the potential effect of the
proposal on tort liability of municipalities is not so easily explained.
This article will examine the development of municipal tort liability in Florida and the status of that liability immediately prior
to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission's work. In addition, the potential effect of the proposal on tort liability of municipalities will be explored.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF MUNIcIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN FLORMA

The history of municipal tort liability in Florida may be described
as "eventful." The Florida courts and legislature have created a
substantial body of law which is both confusing and unpredictable
in its application. The proposed revision by the Constitution Revision Commission must be examined in the perspective of relevant
judicial and legislative precedents.
A.

Judicial Treatment

(1) Pre-Hargrove.
Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach,5 Florida municipalities were generally held
to be immune from tort liability in the exercise of governmental, as
opposed to proprietary or municipal, functions. The denial of liability in tort for a municipality's exercise of a governmental function
was based on the notion that governmental functions were exercised
on behalf of the state for the benefit of the general public, whether
residing within or without the corporate limits of the municipality.7
3. See text accompanying notes 78-94 infra.
4. Florida courts have generally interpreted the language in article X, § 13 of the 1968
Florida Constitution as providing absolute sovereign immunity for the state and counties
absent waiver by legislative enactment or constitutional amendment. See Circuit Ct. v.
Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1976); Spangler v. Florida State
Turnpike Auth., 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1958); Hampton v. State Bd. of Educ., 105 So. 323 (Fla.
1925); Keggin v. Hillsborough County, 71 So. 372 (Fla. 1916); Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d
764 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
5. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
6. See Lewis v. City of Miami, 173 So. 150 (Fla. 1937); Smoak v. City of Tampa, 167 So.
528 (Fla. 1936); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 135 So. 457 (Fla. 1931); Loeb v. City
of Jacksonville, 134 So. 205 (Fla. 1931).
7. See Smoak v. City of Tampa, 167 So. 528 (Fla. 1936).
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When performing a governmental function as an arm of the state, a
municipality shared the state's immunity from tort liability.8
In contrast, Florida municipalities did not share the state's immunity from tort liability in the exercise of proprietary functions,
since, by judicial definition, these functions were performed for the
specific benefit and advantage of the community embraced within
a municipality's boundaries, and not on behalf of the state for the
benefit of the public generally.' The judicial determination of
whether a particular municipal function was to be denominated
"governmental" or "proprietary" was made primarily on a case-bycase basis.'"
(2) Hargrove.
In Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach," the town was sued for the
alleged wrongful death of a prisoner who died of smoke suffocation
while incarcerated in an unattended town jail. The trial court had
dismissed the action on the ground that the town was immune from
liability. In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court first traced the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to its judicial origins and then recognized that "numerous strange and incongruous results" had been
produced by drawing the distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions in determining the extent to which municipalities enjoyed sovereign immunity." Analogizing the modern city to
a large business institution existing mainly for the benefit of the
people within its municipal limits, the court concluded that "[t]o
continue to endow this type of organization with sovereign divinity
appears to us to predicate the law of the Twentieth Century upon
an Eighteenth Century anachronism. Judicial consistency loses its
8. See Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 180 So. 378 (Fla. 1938); City of Miami v. Lewis,
104 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958). In Elrod, the court stated that a municipality
"in performing the governmental duties conferred on it by the Legislature should not be
subjected to any greater liability than the Legislature." 180 So. at 381.
The sovereign immunity of the state is the evolutionary result of the proposition that "the
King can do no wrong." See Note, A Statutory Approach to Governmental Liability in
Florida, 18 U. FA. L. REv. 653, 653-54 (1966).
9. See Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 135 So. 457, 459 (Fla. 1931).
10. In City of Tampa v. Easton, 198 So. 753 (Fla. 1940), the court stated:
What are governmental functions and what are corporate authority or duties of a
municipality are not comprehensively defined in the law but are to be determined
in each case upon a judicial interpretation and application of appropriate provisions
or principles of law to the facts legally shown or admitted as may be provided by
controlling substantive and procedural law.
Id. at 755. See also Barth v. City of Miami, 1 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1941); City of Lakeland v. State
ex rel. Harris, 197 So. 470 (Fla. 1940).
11. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
12. Id. at 132-33.
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virtue when it is degraded by the vice of injustice."' 3
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court in Hargrove expressly
receded from its prior decisions that a municipality was immune
from liability for the torts of its police officers. 4 Ignoring any distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, the court
held that "when an individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee while
acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual
is entitled to redress for the wrong done."' 5 However, municipal
immunity for the exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative,
and quasi-judicial functions was specifically preserved."6
(3) Post-Hargrove.
In the decade following Hargrove, the Florida Supreme Court had
several opportunities to apply and explain its decision in that case.
7 for example,
In City of Miami v. Simpson,"
the issue was whether
the Hargrove rule extended to intentional torts committed by municipal policemen in the course of their employment. In holding that
a municipality may be liable for such torts, the court stated that the
primary concern in Hargrove was not the nature of the wrong.
Rather, the thrust of Hargrove was to eliminate the "nebulous"
distinctions between governmental and proprietary functions and to
determine liability based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. 8
Thus, following Hargrove it appeared that municipal tort liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior would be established in
Florida without immunity or limitation, except for those cases in
which an employee's or agent's tortious act or omission occurred in
the performance of a legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative or quasijudicial function. 9
13. Id. at 133.
14. Id. See generally Price & Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6
U. FLA. L. REv. 330 (1953).
15. 96 So. 2d at 133-34. The court referred to the dissenting opinions in City of Miami v.
Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953) and Williams v. City of Green Cove Springs, 65 So. 2d 56
(Fla. 1953), "for a more thorough and lucid explanation of our justification for departure from
the rule of municipal immunity." 96 So. 2d at 134.
16. 96 So. 2d at 133. As examples, the court cited Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 180
So. 378 (Fla. 1938) and Akin v. City of Miami, 65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953).
17. 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965).
18. Id. at 436-37. In Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965), the court reiterated its decision in Hargrove but denied the recovery of punitive damages in tort against a
municipality. The court stated, "Except as specifically limited, it [Hargrove] laid aside the
governmental-proprietary dichotomy and recognized a right to compensation for a wrong
done." Id. at 456.
19. See Evanoff v. City of St. Petersburg, 186 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Shipp v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Thompson v. City of
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Unfortunately, this relatively clear, post-Hargrove picture of
municipal tort liability was clouded by the decision in Modlin v.
City of Miami Beach.10 Miami Beach was sued for the alleged negligence of a city building inspector in approving the construction of
a retail store mezzanine which subsequently collapsed, causing the
death of a shopper. In its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court first
determined that since enforcement of the city's building code was
an executive function, the city was not immune from the plaintiff's
claim under the rule of Hargrove.' But, the court reasoned that
since the city could only be liable for the alleged negligence of the
building inspector on the principle of respondeat superior, the city
was entitled to assert any defense which was available to the building inspector."2 The court then recognized the defense that the
building inspector's duty to the plaintiff in inspecting the store
mezzanine was no different than the duty he owed to the public
generally. The court held that the plaintiff was precluded from recovery on the ground that a public officer is liable for injuries proximately caused by the negligent performance of his ministerial duties
only when the injured person has a "special and direct interest" in
23
the officer's proper performance of those duties.
(4) Recent cases.
Since the Modlin decision, the cases relating to municipal tort
liability may be characterized as an attempt by Florida appellate
courts to reconcile the limiting effect of that decision with the broad
scope of Hargrove and to apply the rules of both cases to specific
factual situations. 21 The result has been a partial resurrection of the
governmental-proprietary distinction purportedly abolished in
Hargrove. For example, in City of Tampa v. Davis,25 the Second
District Court of Appeal recognized that Modlin had modified the
Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Hewitt v. Venable, 109 So. 2d 185
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
20. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
21. Id. at 73. The court established definitions for "legislative," "judicial," and
"executive" functions: legislative action is prospective and nondiscriminatory, prescribing a
general rule for future operations; judicial and executive actions are retroactive and discriminatory, applying the general rule to specific situations; judicial action is distinguished from
executive action by the presence of procedural safeguards of notice and hearing. The court
further stated that, because of Hargrove, "tort liability of municipal corporations may now
be equated with that of private corporations." Id.
22. Id. at 75.
23. Id. at 76.
24. See Seligman & Beals, The Sovereignty of Florida Municipalities: In-Again, OutAgain, When-Again, 50 FLA. B.J. 338 (1976).
25. 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).

932

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:927

scope of Hargrove by the introduction of the "special and direct
interest" test into the law of municipal tort liability."6 But the Davis
court determined that since the building inspector in Modlin had
been performing an executive or administrative duty in carrying out
what was, prior to Hargrove, classified as a "governmental function," Modlin should be construed as requiring the application of
the "special and direct interest" test only in those limited circumstances. 7 Similarly, in Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach,"8 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the law of municipal tort
liability as developed in Hargrove and Modlin, stating that
Hargrove had created a new area of municipal liability in the exercise of "governmental functions," while Modlin had not reduced the
area of previously existing municipal liability in the exercise of
"proprietary functions." 9 The Gordon court summarized the status
of municipal tort liability in Florida as follows:
(1) as to those municipal activities which fall in the category of
proprietary functions a municipality has the same tort liability as
a private corporation;
(2) as to those activities which fall in the category of governmental functions ". . . a municipality is liable in tort, under the doctrine of respondent [sic] superior, only when such tort is committed against one with whom the agent or employee is in privity, or
with whom he is dealing or is otherwise in contact in a direct
transactionor confrontation."
(3) as to those activities which fall in the category of judicial,
26.

Id. at 452-53.

27. Id. This interpretation of Modlin was combined with the Davis court's view that the

"special direct interest" test contemplates either "privity or an arm's length relationship" in
which a municipal employee or agent is dealing directly with the person injured. Id. at 45253. The court stated:
We conclude, therefore, that in the light of Modlin, a municipality is liable in
tort, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, when its agent or employee commits
a tort in the performance, or by the nonperformance, of an executive (or administrative) duty within the scope of a governmental function, only when such tort is
committed against one with whom the agent or employee is inprivity, or with whom
he is dealing or is otherwise in contact in a direct transactionor confrontation.
Id. at 454.
Applying its conclusion to the facts of the case, the court held that the alleged negligence
of the city had occurred in the performance of a governmental function, i.e., controlling
highway traffic. But the court denied relief since the plaintiff's injuries, received in a traffic
accident where a stop sign collapsed and had not been replaced, did not arise out of any direct
or special transaction between the plaintiff and the city's agents or employees. Id. at 452, 45455.
28. 321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), writ discharged, 349 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
1977).
29. Id. at 80.
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quasi judicial, legislative, and quasi legislative functions, a municipality remains immune.1

The court concluded its opinion by expressing discontent with the
state of the law in the area of municipal tort liability where recovery
depends on artificial distinctions between governmental and prothe Florida Supreme Court for
prietary functions, but it deferred to
3
'
law.
the
in
change
any substantive
But the Florida Supreme Court has eschewed all opportunities to
clarify or reconcile Hargrove and Modlin,3" although it stated as
recently as 1976 that "existing precedent has led to some confusion
over the viability of the [governmental-proprietary] distinction in
33
the municipal area.
B.

Legislative Treatment

(1) Section 768.28.
While the Florida courts were moving almost full circle in their
utilization of the governmental-proprietary dichotomy to determine
municipal tort liability, the Legislature enacted section 768.28 of
the Florida Statutes. 34 This statute waived the sovereign immunity
of the state and its agencies and subdivisions, including municipalities, to the extent provided therein. 3
30.

Id. (citations omitted).

31. The court noted that the city could be liable for its alleged negligence in the design,
construction, and maintenance of the street where the plaintiffs son was killed in a traffic
accident, since road maintenance is a proprietary function, but that the city could not be held
liable for negligence in failing to place traffic control devices at the location of the accident,
since the installation and maintenance of traffic control devices is a governmental function
and there had been no privity or direct relationship between the plaintiffs son and a city
agent or employee. Id.; see Clifton v. City of Fort Pierce, 319 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); City of Tallahassee v. Elliot, 326 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In
Elliot, the First District Court of Appeal seemingly aligned itself with the Second and Fourth
District Courts of Appeal in its view of Hargrove and Modlin, apparently discounting its
earlier decision in Nobles v. City of Jacksonville, 316 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
writ discharged, 349 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1977).
32. The court discharged writs of certiorari in Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321
So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), writ discharged, 349 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1977), and
Nobles v. City of Jacksonville, 316 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), writ discharged,
349 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1977).
33. Circuit Ct. v. Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 1976).
34. Ch. 73-313, 1973 Fla. Laws 711. In the following year, the legislature amended § 768.28
to require the state to pay judgments against state officers, employees, or agents which arise
from some action within the scope of their employment, and to change the section's effective
date. Ch. 74-235, 1974 Fla. Laws 663.
35. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (1977) defines the terms "state agencies or subdivisions" to
include "the executive departments, the legislature, the judicial branch, and the independent
establishments of the state; counties and municipalities; and corporations primarily acting
as instrumentalities or agencies of the state, counties, or municipalities."
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Section 768.28 provides in part:
Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money damages against the
state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss of property,
personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while
acting within the scope of his office or employment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act."
The primary limitations on liability are monetary limits on the
amount of judgments or claims which the state or its agencies or
subdivisions may be required to pay. 37 These monetary limits are
$50,000 for the claim or judgment of any one person and $100,000
for claims or judgments arising out of any one incident. These
limits would be supplanted, however, to the extent that the state
or one of its agencies or subdivisions was protected by liability insurance. In that event recovery would be limited to the amount of the
insurance coverage.3 9 The excess of any judgment or judgments over
these amounts "may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid
in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature."40
(2) AGO 076-41.
This partial waiver of sovereign immunity became effective for
most agencies and subdivisions of the state, including municipali36. Id. § 768.28(1). The measure was a limited waiver of sovereign immunity enacted
under art. X, § 13 of the 1968 Florida Constitution. See note 1 supra.
37. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1977). Other limitations specified in the section are the prohibition of punitive damages and interest for the period prior to judgment, id.; claims against
the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions must be presented in writing to the appropriate
agency prior to bringing suit, id. § 768.28(6); civil actions must be commenced against the
state or one of its agencies or subdivisions within four years after such claim accrues, id. §
768.28(11); and no action may be brought against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions by a person injured as a result of a riot, unlawful assembly, public demonstration, mob
violence, or civil disobedience in which he unlawfully participates, id. § 768.28(12).
38. The limitation of $100,000 per incident originally referred only to claims or judgments
paid by "the state," but chapter 77-86, 1977 Fla. Laws 161 [hereinafter cited as ch. 77-86],
extended this limitation to "agencies and subdivisions" as well. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
39. Ch. 73-313, 1973 Fla. Laws 711.
40. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1977). Presumably, "further act of the Legislature" means a
"claims bill" authorizing or directing a state agency or subdivision to pay the excess amount
of the judgment.
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ties, on January 1, 1975.11 The effect of the legislation on municipal
tort liability became an issue shortly thereafter, culminating in Attorney General Opinion 076-41, issued on February 23, 1976.42
Attorney General Opinion 076-41 was a response to several questions posed by a city attorney relating to judgments in excess of the
monetary limits on the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in
section 768.28. The attorney general chose to respond by addressing
the fundamental issue suggested by the inquiry: "What effect, if
any, does the state's waiver of sovereign immunity from tort liability contained in s.768.28, F.S., have on the tort liability of
municipalities? 4 3 As a practical matter, it was necessary to address
this basic issue since the inquiry, as posed, indicated that the city
was considering some action to reduce or eliminate its insurance
coverage and rely on the monetary limits of the statute."
In his opinion, the attorney general quoted from Modlin v. City
of Miami Beach for the proposition that Florida municipalities possess no aspect of the state's sovereign immunity, except in the exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial
functions."5 Thus, since the statutory waiver of the sovereign immunity could logically operate only to the extent that municipalities
shared that sovereign immunity, the attorney general opined that
the waiver applied only to liability arising from the exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial functions.
Moreover, since the monetary limits on the waiver of sovereign
immunity could operate only to the extent that the waiver itself
operated, such limits, according to the attorney general, were relevant only when a claim or judgment against a municipality arose
out of the exercise of those "immune functions." Because municipal
activities attributable to those immune functions are ordinarily
minimal, the attorney general concluded that section 768.28 did
"not operate to limit in any substantive way the tort liability of
municipalities under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior.",
41. Id. § 768.30. The section became effective for executive departments of the state on
July 1, 1974.
42. [1976] FLA. Arry. GEN. ANN. REP. 70. Earlier, an opinion was written by Frederick
Karl, later a Florida Supreme Court justice, to the Florida Association of Insurance Agents,

in which he questioned whether future court decisions would uphold the validity of the
application of § 768.28 to municipalities. See Karl, PotentialImpact of the Waiver of Sover-

eign Immunity on Local Government in Florida, in A GUIDE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LIABILITY
RISK FOR THE FLORIDA PUBLIC INSTITUTION 52 (Florida Association of Insurance Agents ed. Oct.
1974) (available at the Florida Association of Insurance Agents, Tallahassee, Fla.).
43. [1976] FLA. ATrY. GEN. ANN. REP. 70.
44. Id.
45. 201 So. 2d 70, 73 (Fla. 1967).
46. (19761 FLA. Arry. GEN. ANN. REP. at 71; see [1975] FLA. Arry. GEN. ANN. REP. 193,
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(3) Chapter 77-86.
In response to Attorney General Opinion 076-41, the Florida Legislature enacted chapter 77-86, Laws of Florida, to clarify the legislative intent with respect to application to municipalities of the
limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity contained in section 768.28. Thus, the preamble to chapter 77-86 specifies that the
legislative intent in enacting section 768.28 was "to make the state,
the counties, and the municipalities liable for tort claims in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances . . . ."I The preamble further explains that
"the Attorney General . . . failed to recognize the basis for the
limitation of liability set forth in subsection (5) of section 768.28
"48

Chapter 77-86 amended section 768.28 in several important respects. First, it clearly established that all claims against municipalities are within the monetary limits of liability contained in section 768.28. This is accomplished by the addition of the following
words to subsection (5) of section 768.28: "The limitations of liability set forth in this subsection shall apply to the state and its agencies and subdivisions whether or not the state or its agencies or
subdivisions possessed sovereign immunity prior to July 1, 1974.' 4
Assuming the constitutional validity of chapter 77-86,10 Florida
municipalities are now protected against judgments in tort that
exceed $50,000 per person or $100,000 per incident, regardless of the
nature of the municipal function giving rise to the tort action. Since
municipalities in Florida, subsequent to the Hargrove decision,
have been exposed to unlimited tort liability in the performance of
all municipal functions not denominated legislative, judicial, quasiwhich concluded that on the basis of Suwanee County Hosp. Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911
(Fla. 1952), a special district hospital possessed no aspect of the sovereign immunity of the
state upon which § 768.28 could operate to limit the claims of the hospital's paying patients.
47. Ch. 77-86, supra note 38. Similar language is found in FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1)(5) (1977).
See note 48 infra. See also FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (1977), defining "state agencies and subdivisions" to include municipalities.
48. It appears that the preamble stands for the proposition that Attorney General Opinion
076-41 was erroneous in failing to recognize that the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in
§ 768.28 involved a two-step process. First, following the preamble's reasoning, the state and
its subdivisions were declared to be subject to tort liability "if a private person, would be
liable . . .in accordance with the general laws of this state .. ."FA. STAT. § 768.28(1)
(1977). Thus, the state and its subdivisions, including municipalities, had no sovereign immunity. The second step was to limit the extent of this potential liability. See id. § 768.28(5);
note 38 supra.
49. Ch. 77-86, supra note 38, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1977)). Although
this language may be the most important amendment to § 768.28, it is not referred to in the
new statute's 'title.
50. See text accompanying notes 56-77 infra.
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legislative, or quasi-judicial, this law has the significant effect of
reducing the tort liability of municipalities. This result is clearly
inconsistent with the approach taken in Attorney General Opinion
076-41, 51 which assumed that section 768.28 was intended to expand
the tort liability of the state and its agencies and subdivisions, and
negates the attorney general's conclusion that section 768.28 does
not limit the tort liability of municipalities "in any substantive
52
way."
A second important amendment to section 768.28 made by chapter 77-86 was the repeal of subsection (10). Subsection (10) had
provided that the monetary limits of liability contained in section
768.28 did not apply to the extent that an agency or subdivision had
purchased liability insurance in excess of those limits. The repeal
of subsection (10), therefore, established without exception the
maximum allowable recovery against a municipality in a suit in tort
at $50,000 per person and $100,000 per incident. Since most municipalities in Florida have maintained liability insurance in excess of
those amounts,53 chapter 77-86, again assuming its validity, would
have the immediate and direct impact of reducing the amount of
judgments actually recovered against municipalities.
Third, chapter 77-86 added subsection (13) to section 768.28,
empowering the state and its agencies and subdivisions to be selfinsured, to enter into risk management programs, or "to purchase
liability insurance for whatever coverage they may choose, or to
have any combination thereof, for any claim, judgment, and claims
54
bill which they may be liable to pay pursuant to this section."
Thus, a municipality is effectively precluded by chapter 77-86 from
purchasing liability insurance coverage in excess of $50,000 per person or $100,000 per incident to protect it against judgments in tort.
Apparently, the only liability insurance coverage which may now be
obtained by a municipality in excess of those limits is that which
51. See note 48 supra.
52. [19761 FLA. ATY. GEN. ANN. REP. at 71. But see notes 56-77 infra and accompanying
text, questioning the constitutionality of ch. 77-86.
53. A recent survey of municipal liability insurance conducted by the Florida League of
Cities revealed that in June, 1976, the most frequently reported limits of liability insurance
were $100,000 per person and $300,000 per incident. Moreover, between 1970 and 1976, the
cost of liability insurance increased about 39%. See Liability Insurancefor FloridaCities,FLA.
MUN. REcoRD, Jan. 1977, at 2, 4. The article notes that the enactment in 1973 of § 768.28
had no impact on the amounts of insurance purchased by Florida municipalities because of
uncertainty about whether the $50,000/$100,000 limitations of liability applied to municipalities. See Fort Lauderdale, Fla., City Commission Resolution 76-189 (June 1, 1976) (urging
the legislature to clarify § 768.28 because of "ever increasing rates charged by insurance
companies for all types of liability insurance").
54. Ch. 77-86, supra note 38, § 3 (emphasis added).
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protects against the payment of claims bills awarded against the
municipality by the Florida Legislature.
Finally, chapter 77-86 amended section 768.28 to correct an apparent drafting error in subsection (5). Although subsection (5) had
expressly included state agencies and subdivisions, including municipalities, within the $50,000 limit of liability for the claims made
by any one person, state agencies and subdivisions were not included within the $100,000 limit of liability for claims arising out
of one incident.5 5 Chapter 77-86 cured this omission.
C.

The Constitutional Validity of Chapter 77-86

The constitutional validity of a statute limiting the tort liability
of particular persons and governmental entities, including municipalities, is not a new issue in Florida." The issue stems primarily
from consideration of the access-to-courts mandate of the Florida
Constitution, which provides that: "The courts shall be open to
every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."5 The varying judicial resolutions of the issue, based upon the guarantee of a remedy for every
wrong and general notions of equal protection, may be illustrated
by several Florida Supreme Court opinions. In Williams v. City of
Jacksonville,58 the court considered the validity of a municipal
charter provision, enacted by special law, which limited tort actions
against the city to cases involving "gross negligence," if notice of
damage had been given to the city within a specified period of time.
The court upheld the notice requirement as "a question of legislative policy," but it construed the charter provision so as to eliminate
the requirement that a tort action against the city must involve
gross negligence." In support of this construction, the court cited its
55. Id. § 1.
56. For a detailed judicial treatment of statutory limitations on the liability of governmental entities in another state, see Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1976).
For a brief but excellent analysis of the subject with respect to municipalities in Florida prior
to chapter 77-86, see Marsicano, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Act-Its Destiny, FLA. MUN.
RECORD, May 1975, at 2.
57. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 4, from which this section was.
derived, provided: "All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law,
and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
58. 160 So. 15 (Fla. 1935).
59. Id. at 21. "(T]he word 'gross,' preceding the word 'negligence' in the charter provision
here involved, may be regarded as eliminated, so that the provision may in other respects be
held valid, and not in conflict with Section 4 of our Declaration of Rights." Id.; see Ragans
v. City of Jacksonville, 106 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958), in which the court stated
that "under' the rationale of the Hargrove case, municipal tort liability cannot be validly
restricted solely to suits for damages arising out of gross negligence." Id. at 862.
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earlier decision in Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee° for the proposition that:
it is always quite difficult, if not impossible, to give a satisfactory
reason for holding a city immune from liability when through its
own negligence or the carelessness or inefficiency of its agents and
employees it violates a right of a citizen to his injury, especially
when one considers [Section 4 of the Declaration of Rights, Florida
Constitution, 1885]."'
Since the plaintiffs injuries had not occurred as a clear result of the
city's performance of a governmental function, however, the court
declined to rule on whether the legislature could validly limit the
liability of the city in the exercise of a governmental function.
2
In 1952, the court in Suwannee County Hospital Corp. v. Golden"
considered the validity of a provision of a special law immunizing a
public, nonprofit hospital corporation from liability for any negligence of its officers, agents, or employees. Concluding that the hospital corporation was engaged in a "proprietary function," the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the provision on the basis that it
divested the hospital's paying patients of their constitutional right
3
to redress for wrongs.
Similarly, in Woods v. City of Palatka," the court reviewed a
municipal charter provision immunizing the city from liability for
injuries due to defective streets, sidewalks, and other public
grounds, and for the negligence of its officers and employees. In
Woods, the plaintiff was injured by falling into a hole in a sidewalk.
Concluding that the maintenance of sidewalks was a "proprietary
function" and citing Suwannee County Hospital," the Woods court
stated that "the City of Palatka cannot constitutionally be exempt
from liability for its negligence in the discharge of its duty to exer60.
61.
62.
63.

94 So. 697 (Fla. 1922).
160 So. at 20.
56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
Id. at 913. The court concluded:
It is our view that one who enters a hospital of the type of appellant and pays
for the professional services he receives is entitled to the same protection, and under
our constitution, to the same redress for wrongs, that he would be entitled to had
he had the same experience in a privately owned and operated hospital. . ..
At least as to those who are paying patients like appellee, the hospital is operated
in a proprietary capacity, and they may not be divested of constitutional rights by
the attempted statutory immunization.

Id.
64.
65.

63 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1953).
56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
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66
cise reasonable diligence in repairing defects in sidewalks .
not
had
provision
charter
Moreover, the court reasoned, since the
imposed on abutting landowners civil liability for injuries due to
defective sidewalks, the adoption of a contrary position would
"leave the appellant without any remedy and would violate. Section
4 of the Declaration of Rights of our ... Constitution." 6
Finally, in the 1973 landmark decision of Kluger v. White, 8 the
Florida Supreme Court invalidated, by a four-to-three vote, section
627.738, Florida Statutes, which had in effect abolished the traditional right of action in tort for property damage resulting from an
automobile accident. Section 627.738 provided that a person suffering such damage had to look to his own insurer unless he had chosen
not to purchase property damage insurance and had suffered property damage in excess of $550. Reviewing the requirements of article
I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, the Kluger majority
adopted the rule that

where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption
of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of
Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law
of the State pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 2.-01, F.S.A., the Legislature
is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State
to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no
alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be
shown.66

On the basis of this rule, the court determined that the legislature
had not demonstrated an "overpowering public necessity" for the
abolition of the statutory and common law right to sue an automotive tortfeasor for property damage and that no alternative protection for the victim of an automobile accident had been provided."0
66. 63 So. 2d at 637.
67. Id. at 637-38.
68. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
69. Id. at 4. See also Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1948), where the court upheld
a general law abolishing the common law rights of action for alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry, on the ground that these forms of
action had become instruments of extortion and blackmail.
70. 281 So. 2d at 5; see Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), upholding
the personal injury provisions of § 627.737, Florida Statutes, on the ground that the statute's
requirement that the owner of a vehicle maintain "security," by insurance or otherwise,
provided a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort for personal injuries, the
injured party being assured of recovery from his own insurer.
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Applying the rationale of the foregoing cases to chapter 77-86, it
appears doubtful that tort actions which arise out of a municipality's exercise of a traditionally denominated "governmental function" are protected by article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution. This conclusion is compelled by the Florida Supreme Court's
early acknowledgement that municipalities were immune from liability at common law when exercising a governmental function 7' and
by the court's apparent recognition that the legislature could reestablish the governmental-proprietary distinction purportedly abolished in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.7 ' Thus, the Florida
Legislature apparently is not restrained by article I, section 21 from
imposing monetary limits on the liability of municipalities, to the
extent that the liability arises in the performance or exercise of a
governmental function.
With respect to tort actions which arise out of a municipality's
exercise of a "proprietary function," it appears that such actions are
protected by article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution. This
conclusion is compelled by the absence of any judicial holding that
municipalities are immune from liability at common law when performing proprietary functions73 and by the Florida Supreme Court's
clear rejection of legislative attempts to limit such liability.74 Thus,
at least to the extent that chapter 77-86 purports to limit the liability of municipalities in the exercise of proprietary functions, the
limitations must apparently be measured against the two-fold test
of Kluger.75
71. See Lewis v. City of Miami, 173 So. 150 (Fla. 1937), in which the court stated that
"[tlhere was a time when all municipal functions were governmental and therefore municipal corporations were wholly free from responsibility for torts or civil wrongs, by the common
law." Id. at 152.
72. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); see Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965), in
which it is noted that "three sessions of the Legislature have now intervened [since
Hargrove] and there has been no legislative restriction on the Hargrove rule." Id. at 456.
73. It would be difficult to find the rationale for constitutional protection of claims for
proprietary functions within the four corners of the Kluger test since the narrow legal issue
of liability of a municipality for proprietary functions had not been decided by July 4, 1776.
See FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1977). This is so because of the failure of the pre-1776 common law to
articulate a governmental-proprietary distinction. See note 71 supra. But the supreme court
has clearly held that such a cause of action is constitutionally protected. See notes 61-70 and
accompanying text supra. The rationale for those decisions, in light of the Kluger test, would
appear to be that a municipality, when acting in a proprietary capacity, closely resembles a
private corporation and is liable for torts arising from their actions under common law. See
Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 135 So. 457, 459 (Fla. 1931).
74. See notes 60-69 and accompanying text supra.
75. As to a possible challenge to the operation and amount of the monetary limits contained in § 768.28, see State v. Silva, 478 P.2d 591 (Nev. 1970), in which the Nevada Supreme
Court held that a $25,000 limit on the recovery of any claimant for tort liability of the state
was not violative of the federal equal protection clause. Further, the Nevada court rejected
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Applying the Kluger test to chapter 77-86, the only alternative
method provided by the new law for a plaintiff to recover losses in
excess of the monetary limits is by some further act of the legislature, i.e., a claims bill. As to whether the Florida courts would
consider the legislative process to be a reasonable alternative to an
action in tort, suffice to say that there is no case adopting such a
position.7" Moreover, in light of the legislature's obvious intent in
enacting chapter 77-86 to reduce the financial burden on municipalities resulting from unlimited exposure to tort liability, it would be
anomalous indeed if the court found that the claims bill remedy is
a "reasonable alternative" to actions in tort against municipalities.
Such a finding would imply that the claims bill remedy presents a
financial risk to municipalities equivalent to actions in tort.
As to the existence of an "overpowering public necessity" to limit
the tort liability of municipalities in the exercise of proprietary
functions, the legislature recited in the preamble to chapter 77-86
that municipalities "are experiencing difficulty obtaining liability
insurance, and, if the insurance is available, the rates are exorbitant
and often beyond the ability of the local taxpayers to afford ..
The judicial determination of whether this "difficulty" constitutes
the overpowering public necessity required by Kluger will undoubtedly turn on the facts presented to the courts by proponents of
chapter 77-86. If it can be shown that the fiscal viability of Florida
municipalities is at stake and that no alternative means exist to deal
with the problem, the courts may be persuaded to uphold chapter
77-86 against such a constitutional challenge."

III.

THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF PROPOSAL
ON MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY

197

Initially, it is obvious that the proposed article X, section 12
would abolish constitutionally the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in Florida as a defense in actions against the state and local governments for personal injury, wrongful death, and property damage.7,
the plaintiff's argument that the state had waived the $25,000 limit by purchasing liability
insurance in excess of that amount.
76. But see Circuit Ct. v. Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla.
1976).
77. The fact that the claims bill remedy is provided for in chapter 77-86 may make a
finding of public necessity more palatable to the courts. See ch. 77-86, supra note 38, § 1.
78. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is still viable in Florida. See Circuit Ct. v.
Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1976). The type of torts included in
the term "personal injury" is an issue which will probably be litigated if the revision commission's proposal is adopted. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 925 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (personal
injury).
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However, aside from its potential impact on the monetary limits on
municipal tort liability established by section 768.28, Florida Statutes, as amended by chapter 77-86, Laws of Florida, the Florida
Constitution Revision Commission's proposal, if adopted, should
have only a limited effect on municipal tort liability.
This limited effect stems from the Florida Supreme Court's previous determination in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach that municipalities do not share the sovereign immunity of the state except
in the exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial functions.7 9 It is only these latter functions, therefore, upon
which the proposed constitutional revision could operate to subject
municipalities to new tort liability for personal injury, wrongful
death, or property damage.8 0 In the exercise of all other functions,
Hargrove has already exposed municipalities to the compensatory
consequences of their torts.5 '
The "special and direct interest" test promulgated in Modlin v.
City of Miami Beach 2 should survive adoption of the proposal. This
conclusion is supported by the origin of the "special and direct
interest" test in the law relating to the duty element of the tort
liability of public officials rather than in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity,"3 and by the sparse judicial precedent on the subject.8
Thus, even if the commission's proposal is adopted, a plaintiff may
still be required to show that the municipal official involved owed
the plaintiff a duty different than that owed the public generally,
at least when the action arises out of the official's performance of a
traditionally denominated "governmental function."
It appears doubtful that the monetary limits on municipal tort
liability contained in section 768.28, as amended by chapter 77-86,
will be sustained as presently constituted if the commission's pro79. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). See also Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965),
discussed in note 18 supra, in which the Florida Supreme Court denied.recovery of punitive
damages from a municipality, thus further limiting the potential effect of the proposed
revision on municipal tort liability.
80. Cf. 1976 FLA. Op. An'Y GEN. 076-41, discussed in text accompanying notes 41-46
supra. Of course, adoption of the proposed revision should not affect the defense of privilege
based on consideration of the public interest. See Cobb's Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coleman, 353
So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
81. Cf. Darville v. Associated Indem. Corp., 323 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975), in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defense of sovereign immunity could not be raised in
a tort action involving a traffic accident that occurred prior to the 1974 constitutional abrogation of sovereign immunity since that court itself had abolished sovereign immunity in 1973.
82. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
83. See id. at 75.
84. See Wesley v. State, 571 P.2d 1057 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); cf. Cheney v. Dade County,
353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (held that the "special and direct interest" test
survived the limited waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 768.28). But see Adams v.
State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
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posal is adopted. First, it may be argued that section 768.28 was
expressly enacted in the appropriate exercise of legislative discretion as a limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity pursuant
to article X, section 13 of the 1968 Florida Constitution 5 and that
chapter 77-86, being an amendment to section 768.28, must be read
within the context of the original statute's general purpose and
scheme." Accordingly, deletion of that 1968 constitutional provision
by adoption of the proposed revision could be viewed as eliminating
the constitutional basis and authority for enactment of section
768.28, as amended by chapter 77-86, thereby abrogating the monetary limits on municipal tort liability contained in the statute. 7
Judicial adoption of such an interpretation would necessarily depend on the position taken by the courts on the independence and
severability of those monetary limits from the remainder of section
768.28.18

Second, besides removing the express constitutional basis for the
enactment of section 768.28, the commission's proposal, if adopted,
could also be viewed as positively prohibiting the imposition of all
substantive limitations on actions in tort against municipalities. In
Vinnicombe v. State, a California court held that a statute requiring
a plaintiff suing the state to file an undertaking for the payment of
costs incurred by the state did not violate a state constitutional
provision granting a right to recover damages to private property
resulting from public use. 9 The court stated that "in the case of a
self-executing constitutional provision [granting a right to sue the
state], while the Legislature can adopt reasonable procedural requirements for the enforcement of such constitutional right, it can
do nothing which would unreasonably curtail or impair it."90 If the
commission's proposal were treated similarly, any statutory curtailment of damages recoverable against municipalities in tort actions,
including the monetary limits on tort liability contained in section
85. See FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1977). See also notes 1, 4 supra.
86. See 1A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 22.34-.35 (4th ed. 1972).
See also Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water & Reclamation Dist., 274 So. 2d 522,
524 (Fla. 1973), for the proposition that legislative intent should be gathered from consideration of the statute as a whole.
87. See 1A C. SANDS,supra note 86, § 23.20; cf. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217
(1934), in which the Court held that to the extent the National Prohibition Act rested on the
grant of authority to Congress by the eighteenth amendment, it immediately became inoperative on the repeal of the eighteenth amendment by the twenty-first amendment.
88. See High Ridge Management Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1977); Lasky
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 21 (Fla. 1974). See generally 1A C. SANDS, supra note
86, § 22.04.
89. 341 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
90. Id. at 706.
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768.28, could be invalidated as unauthorized legislative acts, especially if the courts construe the revision as creating a previously
nonexistent constitutional right to sue the state and local governments.9
Finally, any statutorily imposed monetary limits on the tort liability of municipalities must be sustainable under the access-tocourts mandate of the Florida Constitution."2 Any legislative attempt to impose such limits, at least to the extent that they apply
to traditionally denominated "proprietary functions," would be
subject to challenge on this basis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Florida Constitution Revision Commission's proposed revision of the constitution's sovereign immunity provision is the latest
event in Florida's long history of confusing and unpredictable judicial and legislative treatment of the subject of municipal tort liability. Moreover, the proposal, if adopted, would itself create new issues for the judiciary to resolve, particularly with respect to the
continuing validity of section 768.28, Florida Statutes. Until these
issues are resolved, municipal attorneys should advise their clients
to take all reasonable measures to protect their financial resources
from tort claims, and plaintiffs' attorneys should explore all avenues
of redress for wrongs committed in the name of municipal government.
91. The members of the Florida Constitution Revision Commission who were major proponents of Proposal 197 sought to preclude monetary limits on governmental tort liability,
at least to the extent that such limits did not apply equally to nongovernmental tortfeasors.
The following remarks were made during the commission proceedings. "Sovereign immunity
ought to be abolished at every level of the state. The cap ought to be taken off and let it flow
through." Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 136 (Jan. 10, 1978) (remarks of Commissioner Spence). "And we are told that it would cost too much. Now, I find myself very much
in agreement with Commissioner Annis who says that we should require no special breaks
for cities, municipalities, or other units of government." Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 272 (Jan. 26, 1978) (remarks of Commissioner D'Alemberte). "If I don't have a cap and,
Commissioner Annis, you don't have a cap and Commissioner Moore and the rest of you, then
by god the king shouldn't have a cap. I think it is that simple." 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C.
proceedings 94 (Mar. 8, 1978) (remarks of Commissioner Polak).
92. The Florida Constitution Revision Commission did not recommend any change in
article 1, § 21 of the constitution.

